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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a woman, a mother, beaten horrifically every week.
Burned, bruised, and broken, she pleads for help from the
police—but they refuse; her tormenter is her husband and
marital relationships are no place for the government.  The
woman flees, first a few houses away, later, an entire city away.
But she is dragged back by her abuser, again and again.  Fi-
nally, she escapes to another country with her three children in
tow.  At last she has found a barrier that her abuser cannot
cross.  Does she deserve asylum?  More to the point—will she
be granted asylum?
Domestic violence is a global issue affecting millions of
women.1  The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that
it affects more than one in every three women worldwide and
recently called it “a global health problem of epidemic propor-
tions.”2  The 2010 National Intimate Partner and Sexual Vio-
lence Survey found that more than one-third of women in the
United States have been raped, physically abused, or stalked
by an intimate partner in their lifetime, and approximately
seven million women reported experiencing such abuse in the
1 Cf. Fran S. Danis & Lettie L. Lockhart, Introduction to DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
INTERSECTIONALITY AND CULTURALLY COMPETENT PRACTICE, at xxiii, xxiii–xxiv (Lettie L.
Lockhart & Fran S. Danis eds., 2010) (discussing that domestic violence affects
many people from many different backgrounds).
2 See Press Release, World Health Org., Violence Against Women: A ‘Global
Health Problem of Epidemic Proportions’ (June 20, 2013), http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/releases/2013/violence_against_women_20130620/en/
[http://perma.cc/9CU8-VQ46]; see also Fran S. Danis & Shreya Bhandari, Un-
derstanding Domestic Violence: A Primer (“At least one in every three women
worldwide has been beaten, coerced into sex, or otherwise abused during her
lifetime.” (citation omitted)), in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTERSECTIONALITY AND CULTUR-
ALLY COMPETENT PRACTICE, supra note 1 at 34. R
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year leading up to the survey.3  More than half of female rape
victims reported being raped by an intimate partner.4
Matter of A-R-C-G- involved a Guatemalan woman, Aminta
Cifuentes, similar to the woman described above; she sought
asylum to escape abuse by her husband.5  Previously, similarly
situated applicants from Guatemala and elsewhere were de-
nied asylum in the United States because they failed to estab-
lish that they were members of a “particular social group” and
suffered persecution because of their membership in that
group.6  Ms. Cifuentes succeeded where others had failed.
Even more importantly, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
made its decision binding—stunning those who had fought for
such a precedential decision for years.7  The BIA, which hears
appeals from immigration judges’ decisions, had last issued a
precedential decision dealing with domestic violence asylum
claims in 1999, when it controversially reversed an asylum
grant in Matter of R-A-.8
Scholars and asylum advocates had long urged the BIA to
recognize that domestic violence victims can constitute a “par-
3 MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, THE
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 39
(2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DD7H-XEKL].
4 Id. at 1.
5 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).  Ms. Cifuentes was identified by name in
an article in the New York Times.  Julia Preston, Woman Is First to Be Ruled
Eligible for Asylum in U.S. on Basis of Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2014,
at A12.
6 See, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc)
(denying asylum to a woman who fled domestic violence because she could not
prove that she was persecuted on account of her political opinion or her member-
ship in the (unrecognized) particular social group consisting of “Guatemalan wo-
men who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who
believe that women are to live under male domination”), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec.
906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded and stay
lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
7 See, e.g., Preston, supra note 5 (“The decision . . . resolved nearly two R
decades of hard-fought legal battles over whether such women could be consid-
ered victims of persecution.”).
8 For example, the American Immigration Lawyers Association criticized the
BIA’s 1999 decision in Matter of R-A- as containing “clear errors and inconsisten-
cies with established law.” See AILA Comments to Proposed Regulations on Gen-
der-Based Asylum, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N (Jan. 17, 2001), http://
www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=3006 [http://perma.cc/699U-8N3D].
Although the BIA reversed an immigration judge’s asylum grant in its 1999 deci-
sion, the Attorney General later vacated the BIA’s decision, and the applicant was
eventually granted asylum in 2009. See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917;
Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 391 n.12; see also Jessica Marsden, Note,
Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J. 2512, 2528–30
(2014) (discussing the lack of binding BIA decisions on the issue after Matter of R-
A-).
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ticular social group” under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).9  In August 2014, when the BIA issued Matter of
A-R-C-G-, it took a large step toward officially acceding to advo-
cates’ pleas, but it did not go as far as some had recommended.
The BIA did officially declare that “married women in Guate-
mala who are unable to leave their relationship” are a cogniza-
ble particular social group under the INA.10  The question is,
what now?
This Note analyzes Matter of A-R-C-G-’s potential impact on
domestic violence-based asylum claims in the United States
and more specifically on the proposed amendments to the Im-
migration and Naturalization Services (INS) regulations gov-
erning asylum and withholding eligibility.  This Note explores
how that judgment may affect how immigration judges inter-
pret and apply asylum law’s “particular social group” provision,
as well as how they interpret the associated requirement de-
manding nexus between group membership and the persecu-
tion.  This Note also recommends that judges expand the
holding in Matter of A-R-C-G- and how they should do so; for
example, judges should recognize domestic violence victims
from other countries as comprising particular social groups.
Further, this Note suggests how the INS should revise the pro-
posed amendments in light of Matter of A-R-C-G-.
Part I of this Note outlines asylum law’s development in the
United States and the law as it currently stands, particularly as
it relates to domestic violence victims.  Part I also discusses
U.S. asylum law’s “particular social group” provision and fo-
cuses on the provision’s application in key cases involving
claims based on domestic violence.  Part II analyzes Matter of A-
R-C-G-’s potential impact on asylum adjudication in the United
States.  Part II concludes that although Matter of A-R-C-G- sig-
nifies the BIA’s official recognition that domestic violence may
qualify a victim for asylum, more changes are needed before
asylum seekers can securely base their claims on domestic
violence.  Part III suggests how judges could help advance the
holding in Matter of A-R-C-G- and recommends other changes
9 See, e.g., Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger:
Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM.
U. L. REV. 337, 378 (2009) (“Refugee protection should be available to applicants
who can prove that they have a well-founded fear of future persecution on account
of their membership in the particular social group of ‘women who have fled se-
verely abusive relationships.’”); Preston, supra note 5 (“Since 1995 . . . whether R
domestic abuse victims could be considered for asylum [has been] vigorously
debated by advocates and repeatedly examined by the courts.”).
10 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389–90.
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to the United States’ approach to domestic violence asylum
claims, such as revising and enacting the proposed regulation
amendments.
I
BACKGROUND
The legal issues associated with refugees in the modern era
erupted after World War II, as survivors sought safety around
the world.11  In response, the United Nations adopted the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.  The Convention
defined “refugee.”12  In 1968, the United States signed the 1951
Convention, as updated by the 1967 Protocol, and in 1980, the
United States incorporated the updated refugee definition in
the Refugee Act of 1980.13  The Refugee Act was in turn codified
in the INA.14
Today, to qualify for asylum under U.S. law an applicant
must prove four elements: (1) presence outside of one’s country
of nationality, (2) unwillingness or inability to return to, or to
receive protection from, the country of one’s nationality, (3) the
fact that he or she has suffered past persecution or possesses a
“well-founded fear of [future] persecution,” (4) and the fact that
the persecution occurred “on account of” one of five delineated
grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.15  Notably, neither gender nor
sex is listed as a protected ground.
Domestic violence victims generally seek asylum based on
membership in a particular social group because domestic
abuse does not directly fall under any of the specified grounds
11 See generally Erika Feller, The Evolution of the International Refugee Protec-
tion Regime, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 131–36 (2001) (discussing the
post–World War II development of international refugee law).
12 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.  The 1951 Convention originally restricted its
definition of “refugee” to those fleeing events occurring before January 1, 1951.
Id. at art. I(A)(2).  The 1967 Protocol removed this restriction. See Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees art. I(2), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
13 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 12, 19 R
U.S.T. at 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. at 138; Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, 94
Stat. 102 (codified at Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42) (2012)). See generally Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The
Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 9, 11, 43 (1981) (discussing the Refugee Act’s incorporation of the Conven-
tion’s definition of “refugee”).
14 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A).
15 Id.
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for persecution.16  However, defining a legally acceptable “par-
ticular social group” “on account of”17 the grounds on which a
domestic violence victim was harmed has proven to be chal-
lenging and risky.
A. Issues with Adjudication and Commonly Suggested
Solutions
Although the United States has taken significant steps to
eliminate gender-based violence,18 asylum claim adjudications
remain wildly inconsistent.19  This inconsistency leaves victims
facing doubt, and worse, injury and even murder if their claim
fails and they are forced to return to their native country and
abuser.  Importantly, even when an immigration judge finds
that an asylum seeker has testified credibly to the first three
elements—presence outside of their country of nationality, an
unwillingness or inability to return to their country or receive
protection from their country’s government, and harm that
rises to the level of persecution—the case often turns on
whether the abuse occurred on account of the victim’s member-
ship in a particular social group.  This is known as the nexus
requirement.20  Thus, how a judge applies and interprets this
final element makes or breaks many cases.21
16 See Barbara R. Barreno, Note, In Search of Guidance: An Examination of
Past, Present, and Future Adjudications of Domestic Violence Asylum Claims, 64
VAND. L. REV. 225, 229 (2011). Scholars have highlighted the irony that the
United States would welcome a “classic refugee” “with open arms” when that
classic refugee was seeking protection based on fear of persecution by a tyranni-
cal ruler of a realm documented as targeting a particular tribe, especially when
that tribe challenged the tyrant. See Cianciarulo & David, supra note 9, at 339. R
However, the United States would not entitle a domestic violence victim to the
same protection because the tyrant is the spouse, the realm is the home, and the
tribe is women, especially those in a relationship with the tyrant. See id.
17 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
18 For example, the United States passed the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) in 1994.  Violence Against Women and Department of Justice
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–162, 119 Stat. 2960 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).  VAWA offers two different visas for victims
of domestic violence. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386 div. A § 107, 114 Stat. 1464, 1474–80 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7105 (2012)) (providing a visa for victims of severe forms
of trafficking); id. div. B § 1513, 114 Stat. at 1533–37 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(2012)) (creating a visa that protects victims of certain crimes, such as domestic
violence, who cooperate with authorities in prosecuting those crimes).
19 See Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of
206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L.J. 107, 108–10, 147–48  (2013); Marsden, supra note 8, at 2512. R
20 See Bookey, supra note 19, at 108 n.5 (discussing the nexus requirement R
within the context of “[g]ender asylum”).
21 See, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 913–14 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc)
(denying asylum even though “the level of harm experienced by the respondent
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Differences in how decision makers apply particular social
group analysis and the nexus requirement led to a well-docu-
mented problem—inconsistency in adjudication.22  Scholars
and advocates have suggested various reforms to combat this
issue.  One frequently proposed idea is to recognize gender as a
“particular social group.”23  Others propose adding gender as a
sixth ground for asylum claims.24  Some scholars support ei-
ther change—anything to improve on the “logical inconsisten-
cies” of the current guidelines.25  However, such
recommendations must now be adapted to reflect the BIA’s
groundbreaking declarations in Matter of A-R-C-G-.26
rises beyond the threshold of that required for ‘persecution’” because “[t]he deter-
minative issue . . . is whether the harm experienced by the respondent was, or in
the future may be, inflicted ‘on account of’ a statutorily protected ground” (quot-
ing Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Immigration and Naturalization Service, on
Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women to
INS Asylum Officers (May 26, 1995), http://www.state.gov/s/l/65633.htm
[https://perma.cc/AE9Q-XKSJ])), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), re-
manded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded and stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec.
629 (A.G. 2008); Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 395 (B.I.A. 2014)
(emphasizing that in cases where nexus is not conceded, it is an issue that must
be decided); see also Bookey, supra note 19, at 121. R
22 See Bookey, supra note 19, at 110 (“[T]he absence of binding norms re- R
mains a major impediment to fair and consistent outcomes for women who fear
return to countries where they confront unimaginable harms . . . .”).
23 See, e.g., Michael G. Heyman, Protecting Foreign Victims of Domestic Vio-
lence: An Analysis of Asylum Regulations, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 115,
149 (2008) (“Rather than crafting a hyper-detailed description of social group that
seems patently unrealistic, counsel could rely on women as the cognizable
group.”); Barreno, supra note 16, at 255–58 (“An alternative . . . is to allow R
applicants to claim gender as their particular social group or as ‘the defining
characteristic’ of that group.” (quoting Allison W. Reimann, Comment, Hope for
the Future?  The Asylum Claims of Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1239 (2009))); Crystal Doyle, Note, Isn’t “Persecution”
Enough?  Redefining the Refugee Definition to Provide Greater Asylum Protection to
Victims of Gender-Based Persecution, 15 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 519,
553–54 (2009); Marsden, supra note 8, at 2544 (suggesting a regulation stating R
that “a social group defined solely by the gender of its members is cognizable as a
particular social group”).
24 See, e.g., Barreno, supra note 16, at 254–55 (“Given the prevalence of R
domestic violence . . . one possible solution is to add gender as a sixth basis for an
applicant’s asylum claim.” (citing Leonard Birdsong, A Legislative Rejoinder to
“Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning
to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution . . .,” 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 197, 215
(2008))).
25 See Doyle, supra note 23, at 553–54 (“The addition of a sixth ground or the R
inclusion of statutory definitions that explicitly define the term ‘particular social
group’ to include ‘gender’ would provide more clarity than the common law ‘innate
characteristic’ test and avoid the logical inconsistencies of the various
guidelines.”).
26 See infra Part III.C.2.
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B. Changing Interpretations of “Particular Social Group”
and the Nexus Between Group Membership and
Persecution
In Matter of Acosta, the BIA first defined “membership in a
particular social group.”27  The BIA stated that “ ‘persecution
on account of membership in a particular social group’ . . .
mean[s] persecution that is directed toward an individual who
is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common,
immutable characteristic.”28  The BIA added that the common
characteristic “must be one that the members of the group
either cannot change, or should not be required to change be-
cause it is fundamental to their individual identities or con-
sciences.”29  The BIA justified this interpretation as in line with
the goal of granting asylum only to those individuals who by
their own actions are unable, “or as a matter of conscience
should not be required, to avoid persecution.”30  Asylum seek-
ers put this interpretation to the test in a line of cases involving
domestic violence-based claims.
1. Matter of R-A-: The Root of “Social Visibility”
In Matter of R-A-, a case that some refer to as “one of the
most controversial gender-based asylum cases in United States
history,”31 Rody Alvarado sought asylum based on member-
ship in a particular social group.32  She defined her group as
“Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to
live under male domination.”33  An immigration judge granted
Alvarado asylum, but the BIA rejected the defined social group
and reversed the grant of asylum because the applicant had
not shown that it was a “recognized and understood . . . societal
27 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
28 Id. at 233.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 234.
31 Allison W. Reimann, Comment, Hope for the Future?  The Asylum Claims of
Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1202
(2009); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. R
32 Ms. Alvarado is identified, inter alia, in a summary of the case by the
Center for Gender and Refugee Studies. Matter of R-A-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFU-
GEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-r [http://perma.cc/
YPV3-BJUT].
33 Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc), vacated, 22
I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded
and stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).  The applicant also sought asylum
based on her political opinion, but the BIA rejected that claim as well. Id. at 906.
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faction” or that she was abused because her husband viewed
her as a member of that group.34
The BIA emphasized that a social group definition merely
identifying a common, immutable characteristic was not
enough—rather, although “not determinative, the prominence
or importance of a characteristic within a society is another
factor bearing on whether we will recognize that factor as part
of a ‘particular social group’ under our refugee provisions.”35
Although the BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A- was heavily
criticized36 and regulations were proposed in 2000 to address
those and other asylum issues, Matter of R-A- was stayed for
many years and the regulations remain pending today.37
Significantly, the holding in Matter of R-A- caused judges to
hone in on evaluating how the asylum seeker’s native society
perceived the proposed social group.  This focus eventually led
to a heavy emphasis on “social visibility” and “particularity” as
key factors for analyzing whether a proposed group qualified as
a “particular social group” within the INA’s meaning.38  Deci-
sion makers relied on a highly specific definition of social
group, requiring that purported social groups had particular
and well-defined boundaries, as well as recognizable social visi-
bility.39  For years, nothing steered the BIA away from this
restrictive path.
34 Id. at 918–20.
35 Id. at 919 (emphasis added).
36 See Cianciarulo & David, supra note 9, at 368–71; Marsden, supra note 8, R
at 2529; Reimann, supra note 31, at 1204 (“In re R-A- was immediately followed by R
a flurry of intense criticism . . . .”).
37 The proposed rules would amend the asylum regulations relating to and
defining the terms “persecution,” “on account of,” and “particular social group.”
See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76597–98 (pro-
posed Dec. 7, 2000); Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 906 (A.G. 2001), re-
manded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded and stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec.
629 (A.G. 2008).
38 See, e.g., Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008) (“In
deciding this question, we are guided by our recent decisions holding that mem-
bership in a purported social group requires that the group have particular and
well-defined boundaries, and that it possess a recognized level of social visibil-
ity.”); Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74–76 (B.I.A. 2007) (applying
the “ ‘social visibility’ test” and the “particularity requirement of the refugee defini-
tion” to the respondents’ case).
39 See, e.g., Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232 (B.I.A. 2014) (“In a
series of cases, we applied the concepts of ‘social visibility’ and ‘particularity’ as
important considerations in the particular social group analysis, and we ulti-
mately deemed them to be requirements.”).
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2. “Social Visibility” Emerges in Full Force
The BIA first mentioned “social visibility” in Matter of C-A-
while evaluating whether membership in a proposed particular
social group qualified the applicant for asylum.40  The BIA em-
phasized that it based such decisions in part on the “recogniz-
ability, i.e., the social visibility, of the group in question,”
stressing that a claimed group’s visibility is “an important ele-
ment in identifying the existence of a particular social group.”41
In Matter of C-A-, the asylum seeker proposed that he belonged
to a particular social group comprised of “noncriminal drug
informants working against the Cali drug cartel.”42  However,
the BIA held that this group did not fall within the INA’s “refu-
gee” definition, relying in large part on “the lack of social visibil-
ity of the members of the purported social group.”43
Specifically, the BIA held that this proposed social group
lacked “social visibility” because it found that members of the
asylum seeker’s society, and the Cali cartel, would not recog-
nize group members, as their defining traits were not visible.44
Rather, “the very nature of the conduct at issue is such that it
is generally out of the public view.  In the normal course of
events, an informant against the Cali cartel intends to remain
unknown and undiscovered.”45
Over the next few years the BIA looked to “social visibility”
time and again until it became the standard for evaluating
proposed particular social groups.46  By 2007, the BIA even
referred to this new factor as a “requirement.”47  The new re-
quirement meant that domestic violence victims faced an uphill
battle attempting to prove their asserted group’s “social visibil-
ity” because domestic violence victims often suffer in silence
behind closed doors.48
40 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006).
41 Id. at 959–60.
42 Id. at 957.
43 Id. at 961.
44 Id. at 959–60.
45 Id. at 960.
46 See, e.g., Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 586–88 (B.I.A. 2008)
(noting the “importance of social visibility as a factor in the particular social group
determination”); Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74–75 (B.I.A.
2007) (applying the “social visibility” test to respondents’ proposed particular
social group of “wealthy Guatemalans”).
47 Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 74.
48 See Danis & Bhandari, supra note 2, at 29, 33 (“Because much [domestic] R
violence occurs in the privacy of the home, it is important to recognize that many
incidents go unreported . . . .”).  This is particularly true in societies that implicitly
condone domestic violence by failing to protect the victim. See Cianciarulo &
David, supra note 9, at 369–70; Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of R
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In Matter of C-A-, the BIA also focused on an additional
factor: “particularity.”49  Later BIA decisions picked up this ele-
ment, clarifying that particularity is about “whether the pro-
posed group can accurately be described in a manner
sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized, in the
society in question, as a discrete class of persons.”50  The BIA
rejected purported groups that were “a potentially large and
diffuse segment of society” as lacking particularity, citing con-
cerns that in such instances it became more likely that the
persecutor did not necessarily torment the victim because of
their membership in the alleged group.51  This application of
“particularity” posed a significant hurdle to domestic violence
victims seeking asylum—a consistently large and diverse
group.52
3. Signs of Change: DHS Support for Granting Asylum to
Domestic Violence Victims
In 2009, change came from an unexpected corner—the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS).  That year the DHS
wrote a brief suggesting group formulations that a domestic
violence victim might use to qualify for asylum.53  The DHS
drafted the brief in response to Matter of L-R-, wherein the BIA
denied asylum to a Mexican domestic violence victim because
the social group that she claimed membership in—“Mexican
women in an abusive domestic relationship who are unable to
leave”—lacked social visibility and particularity.54  The DHS
suggested that “Mexican women in domestic relationships who
are unable to leave” or “Mexican women who are viewed as
property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relation-
ship” could qualify as particular social groups.55  It asserted
that its proposed definitions were viable because they identified
why the persecutor targeted the victim56—one of the points
“Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on
Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
47, 94–95 (2008).
49 See 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957 (declaring that the proposed social group was
“too loosely defined” to satisfy particularity).
50 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584.
51 Id. at 585.
52 See Danis & Lockhart, supra note 1, at xxiii–xxiv. R
53 Department of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief at 14–16, Matter
of L-R- (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter DHS Brief], http://graphics8.ny
times.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716-asylum-brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/
Z2MN-SHSE].
54 Id. at 5.
55 Id. at 14.
56 Id. at 14–15.
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that the BIA had found lacking in the social group definition
proposed in Matter of R-A-—and they met the visibility and
particularity requirements.57
Notably, the definitions that DHS suggested were not very
novel—one differed from the definition initially rejected in Mat-
ter of L-R- only in that it eliminated the word “abusive.”  None-
theless, Alvarado’s attorneys jumped on the DHS’s apparent
willingness to recognize domestic violence-based social groups
and submitted a memorandum in her still-undecided case,
proposing a new social group definition for their client modeled
after the DHS’s suggestions: “married women in Guatemala
who are unable to leave the relationship.”58
Alvarado eventually won asylum,59 beginning a trend to-
ward scrutinizing social group definitions less strictly.  Three
months later the respondent in L-R- was also granted asylum
based on the social group definition that the DHS had
recommended.60
Meanwhile, the circuits split as to whether particular social
group analysis required “particularity” and “social visibility,”
questioning the importance of those factors.61  Scholars and
asylum advocates viewed these decisions as the dawning of a
new era in which domestic violence victims seeking asylum
57 See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 919 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc) (“Our
past case law points out the critical role that is played in ‘social group’ analysis by
common characteristics which potential persecutors identify as a basis for the
infliction of harm.”), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded and stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008);
see also Barreno, supra note 16, at 246–47. R
58 Legal Memorandum & Supporting Documentation at 3–4, 8, Matter of R-
A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008) (File No. A 73 753 922), http://cgrs.uchastings
.edu/sites/default/files/R-A-_brief_immigration_court_08_19_2009_0.pdf [http:/
/perma.cc/92LA-HTWX].  The DHS had suggested the definition “Mexican women
in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” in its 2009 brief. See DHS
Brief, supra note 53, at 14–15. R
59 See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 391 n.12 (B.I.A. 2014).
60 Julia Preston, Asylum Granted to Mexican Woman in Case Setting Standard
on Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A14.  The particular social group
in this case was “Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to
leave.” See Brief of Respondents in Support of Applications for Asylum, Withhold-
ing of Removal & CAT Relief at 41, Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2010).
61 Compare Uman˜a-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 671 (6th Cir. 2013) (hold-
ing that an alleged social group must be particular and socially visible), Orellana-
Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2012) (deferring to the BIA’s
“particularity” and “social visibility” test), and Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 681
(8th Cir. 2012) (affirming that “a social group requires sufficient particularity and
visibility” (quoting Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (2011))), with
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that
the BIA’s “particularity” and “social visibility” requirements were not entitled to
deference), and Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting
the social visibility requirement).
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could feel secure that their claims, if similar to L-R-’s and Alva-
rado’s, would succeed.62  However, their hopes flew too high.
Neither decision was binding, leading to inconsistencies in ad-
judication because immigration judges were hesitant to rely on
nonbinding decisions, particularly in the face of “social visibil-
ity” and “particularity” requirements that had long been read
narrowly.63  Precedential recognition only came half a decade
later, in August 2014, in Matter of A-R-C-G-.64
II
ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF MATTER
OF A-R-C-G-
In Matter of A-R-C-G- the BIA recognized that under some
circumstances domestic violence victims can comprise a par-
ticular social group that qualifies for asylum.65  Importantly,
this holding was binding—a fact that distinguished it from
nonprecedent asylum grants in the past.66  The applicant,
Aminta Cifuentes, was a married Guatemalan woman who fled
her abusive husband and entered the United States without
inspection in 2005.67  An immigration judge initially rejected
her asylum claim, but Cifuentes appealed, arguing that she
had proven her “eligibility for asylum as a victim of domestic
violence.”68  Significantly, when the BIA responded to her ap-
peal it explicitly considered “whether domestic violence can, in
some instances, form the basis for a claim of asylum” and
accepted that Cifuentes’s claim asserted a valid particular so-
cial group.69
62 See, e.g., Cianciarulo & David, supra note 9, at 378 (“[I]t is indeed promis- R
ing that the Department of Homeland Security appears receptive to domestic
violence-based asylum in the United States.”); Julia Preston, Officials Endorse
Asylum for Abuse: U.S. May Be Open to Claims of Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2009, at A14.
63 See Bookey, supra note 19, at 109–10; Marsden, supra note 8, at 2530. R
Further, in each case both sides had agreed that asylum should be granted. See
Bookey, supra note 19, at 117 n.40.  The immigration judge highlighted that point R
when granting asylum in Matter of R-A-, interpreting the case as essentially an
agreement by the parties to grant asylum. See id. at 117 n.41.
64 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–94.
65 See id. at 392–93.
66 For example, although asylum was eventually granted in Matter of R-A- and
Matter of L-R-, neither decision was binding. See supra note 63 and accompany- R
ing text.
67 See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388–89; see also Preston, supra
note 5, at A12 (discussing Aminta Cifuentes’s background and the decision in R
Matter of A-R-C-G-).
68 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 390.
69 Id.
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This recognition—that advocates had fought for decades to
win—clarified the BIA’s position on domestic violence-based
asylum claims and provided some guidance in this muddled,
hotly debated area.70  Many hope that the holding will finally
resolve confusion over how decision makers should apply the
“particular social group” provision.71  As one advocate phrased
it, “A judge can no longer say, ‘I believe these horrible things
happened to you but this is just a criminal act, this is not
persecution.’”72  However, upon closer inspection Matter of A-
R-C-G- only provides limited guidance that will likely not rem-
edy the long-standing inconsistencies that have plagued asy-
lum applications by domestic violence victims.  It is merely a
step, albeit a significant one, toward a true solution sometime
in the future.  Further, the novel approach used in Matter of A-
R-C-G- may give rise to new problems with interpretation and
application.
A. The New “Social Distinction” Factor in Asylum Claim
Analysis
Significantly, shortly before deciding Matter of A-R-C-G- the
BIA issued several decisions that re-envisioned “social visibil-
ity.”  Most notably, on February 7, 2014, the BIA rejected the
restrictive “social visibility” requirement and renamed it “social
distinction” in the complementary cases Matter of W-G-R- and
Matter of M-E-V-G-.73  Adopting this new factor marked a signif-
icant change in the BIA’s approach to particular social group
analysis—a change that the BIA used in Matter of A-R-C-G- to
recognize that domestic violence victims can constitute a par-
ticular social group under certain circumstances.
In Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA acknowledged that for years
asylum adjudications were filled with “confusion and a lack of
consistency as adjudicators struggled with various possible so-
cial groups.”74  The BIA declared its intention to “clarify our
interpretation of the phrase ‘membership in a particular social
group’” to encourage consistency in nationwide adjudication of
70 See, e.g., Preston, supra note 5 (“Since 1995 . . . whether domestic abuse R
victims could be considered for asylum [had been] vigorously debated by advo-
cates and repeatedly examined by the courts.”).
71 See id.
72 Id. (quoting Karen Musalo, who is a “professor and director of the Center
for Gender and Refugee Studies at the University of California, Hastings College of
the Law”).
73 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of W-G-
R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 212 (B.I.A. 2014).
74 26 I. & N. Dec. at 231.
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asylum claims.75  The BIA renamed “social visibility” “social
distinction” to make clear that this requirement is aimed at
determining “whether those with a common immutable charac-
teristic are set apart, or distinct, from other persons within the
society in some significant way.  In other words, if the . . .
characteristic were known, those with [it] . . . would be mean-
ingfully distinguished from those who do not have it.”76  The
BIA emphasized in Matter of W-G-R- that such a characteristic
does not need to be literally visible: “To be socially distinct, a
group need not be seen by society; it must instead be perceived
as a group by society.”77  This distinction is crucial to many
domestic violence asylum claims because, as mentioned ear-
lier, victims often suffer in silence, hiding their abuse from
society.78
Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- dealt with claims
based on gang violence,79 but the changes that they introduced
set the stage for the BIA to re-evaluate social group definitions
for domestic violence victims.
B. How the “Social Distinction” Requirement May Impact
Asylum Claims Based on Domestic Violence
The BIA relied on the newly developed “social distinction”
concept to hold in Matter of A-R-C-G- that domestic violence
victims can constitute a particular social group under the
INA.80  The BIA had first used “social distinction” a few months
earlier to replace the “social visibility” test in cases having
nothing to do with domestic abuse.81  The actual impact that
this new factor will have on particular social group analysis
within the domestic violence context—and beyond—is not im-
mediately clear.82  However, the BIA’s comments on “social dis-
tinction” in Matter of A-R-C-G- reveal several possibilities.
Importantly, when predicting how judges will apply the “social
distinction” requirement in the domestic violence context, the
unique challenges that domestic violence claims present must
75 Id. at 234.
76 Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
77 26 I. & N. Dec. at 216.
78 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. R
79 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 229; Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
at 209.
80 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393–94 (B.I.A. 2014).
81 See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 228, 238 and Matter of W-G-R-, 26
I. & N. Dec. at 209, 216, both dealing with asylum claims based on gang violence,
for the “social visibility” concept’s earliest appearances.
82 Matter of A-R-C-G- was decided very recently, on August 26, 2014.
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be taken into account.  The BIA has admitted as much,83 but
its approach nonetheless presents several potential difficulties
for such claims.
1. Social Distinction Determined from Society’s
Perspective
Matter of A-R-C-G- emphasized several key aspects that
supposedly differentiate “social distinction” from previous, sim-
ilar formulations.  First, the BIA stressed that a group’s recog-
nition is determined from society’s perspective, not the
persecutor’s.84  Previously, judges would consider both per-
spectives in their determinations.85  This clarification could
benefit domestic violence victims, whose abusers may very well
refuse to acknowledge them as members of a distinct group.86
Batterers often blame their targets for the abuse, rather than
acknowledging their targets as victims.87  For this reason per-
secutors may resist recognizing their targets as members of a
group of domestic violence victims, making it difficult for asy-
lum seekers to satisfy a social perception requirement based on
their persecutors’ perspectives.  For example, in 2001 in Matter
of R-A-, Alvarado’s claim was rejected in part because she did
not show that “male oppressors see their victimized compan-
ions as part of [the] group” that she had proposed.88  Now asy-
lum seekers will not need to struggle to satisfy that
requirement.
2. Perceiving, as Opposed to Seeing, a Social Group
Second, the BIA reaffirmed another refinement that it had
recently added to its analysis—the distinction between groups
that are “seen” in society as opposed to groups that are per-
83 See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 394 (“[C]ases arising in the
context of domestic violence generally involve unique and discrete issues not
present in other particular social group determinations, which extends to the
matter of social distinction.”).
84 See id.
85 See, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc)
(“The respondent has shown neither that the victims of spouse abuse view them-
selves as members of this group, nor, most importantly, that their male oppres-
sors see their victimized companions as part of this group.”), vacated, 22 I. & N.
Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded and
stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
86 See Cianciarulo & David, supra note 9, at 370 (“As part of the effort to R
control, marginalize and subjugate women, domestic violence is relegated to the
private sphere and is not openly discussed . . . .”).
87 See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 60, 66–67 (1979).
88 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918.
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ceived.89  In Matter of M-E-V-G- the BIA had declared that the
“social visibility” test “was never intended to . . . require[ ] literal
or ‘ocular’ visibility”90 and accordingly only required that a
group “be perceived as a group by society” to be socially dis-
tinct.91  The BIA cited this new definition in Matter of A-R-C-G-,
even though it did not highlight the distinction’s importance in
the domestic violence context.92  Nonetheless, it seems clear
that because domestic violence victims often suffer behind
closed doors, they will have an easier time proving that they are
perceived as a group, even if they cannot show that they are
literally seen by society.93
Toward this end, asylum seekers can now seemingly point
to evidence, such as agencies and other resources in their
countries intended to help domestic violence victims, to show
that their society perceives them as a group.94  Additionally,
the BIA relied on evidence such as State Department reports,
human rights reports, and news articles indicating that Guate-
mala has a “culture of ‘machismo and family violence’” to hold
that the group proposed in Matter of A-R-C-G- was socially dis-
tinct.95  This new approach could benefit asylum seekers from
countries that will not or cannot provide adequate protection
via official sources, such as the police, especially because vic-
tims living in societies that thereby implicitly condone domestic
violence are even more likely to hide their abuse from society.96
Thus, the “social distinction” approach offers several advan-
tages compared to the “social visibility” test, particularly for
domestic violence victims seeking asylum.
Still, it is important to note issues with the social percep-
tion approach raised by scholars such as Fatma Marouf, who
highlighted that “[w]hether a group is socially perceived as dis-
tinct cannot be treated as an all-or-nothing phenomenon, as
social perception is a ‘subjective process shaped by an individ-
ual’s current motivation, emotion, and cognition, as well as his
89 See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 393–94.
90 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 234 (B.I.A. 2014).
91 Id. at 240; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the R
emergence of the distinction between “perceived” and “seen”).
92 26 I. & N. Dec. at 393.
93 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. R
94 See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 394 (“Such evidence would
include whether the society in question recognizes the need to offer protection to
victims of domestic violence . . . .”).
95 Id. at 393–94 (quoting Guatemala Failing Its Murdered Women: Report,
CBC (July 18, 2006, 11:22 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/guatemala-fail
ing-its-murdered-women-report-1.627240 [https://perma.cc/X7RW-DDX2]).
96 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. R
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or her more long-standing traits’ . . . .”97  Not only is social
perception dynamic, but as Marouf noted: “In some cases, the
same group may be both socially invisible and hypervisible as a
stereotypical object.”98  The fluid, subjective nature of social
perception poses serious problems when relying on it as a
method for determining whether a social group exists.  The
major challenge, summed up by Marouf, is that “it would be
naı¨ve for adjudicators to treat social perception . . . as a consis-
tent and reliable means.”99
3. Problems with Matter of A-R-C-G-
The BIA’s rationale in Matter of A-R-C-G- presents several
potential issues for domestic violence victims.  For example,
the BIA recommended that immigration judges focus their so-
cial distinction analysis on “whether the society in question
recognizes the need to offer protection to victims of domestic
violence” and rely on evidence such as laws against domestic
violence in the asylum seeker’s native country, and whether
those laws are enforced.100  These guidelines seemingly aim to
accommodate asylum seekers fleeing countries that recognize
the domestic violence epidemic and have put protective laws in
place, even if those laws go unenforced.  For example, asylum
seekers who repeatedly seek help from the police, but are re-
fused, apparently qualify for asylum like Aminta Cifuentes.101
This reading is supported by the BIA’s emphasis on the fact
that Cifuentes’s native Guatemala “has laws in place to prose-
cute domestic violence crimes, [but] enforcement can be
problematic.”102
However, the BIA’s explanation is not quite clear.  Implicit
in the focus on protective laws is the message that asylum
seekers have the best chance at success if they present evi-
dence that native authorities refused to enforce laws intended
to protect them.  But what if there are no such laws?  What if
the asylum applicant never went to the police?103 The BIA did
97 Marouf, supra note 48, at 73 (quoting Matthew D. Lieberman & Jennifer H. R
Pfeifer, The Self and Social Perception: Three Kinds of Questions in Social Cognitive
Neuroscience, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 195 (Alexander
Easton & Nathan J. Emery eds., 2005)).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 394.
101 See id. at 389.
102 Id. at 394.
103 Notably, such circumstances could also make it difficult for an applicant to
meet asylum claim requirements other than social distinction.  For example, Mat-
ter of A-R-C-G- was remanded for the immigration judge to determine whether the
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not clarify whether the social distinction test demands proof
that protective laws exist or whether applicants must attempt
to obtain protection via such laws, if they exist.  Without clear
guidance on these points, decision makers could require that
applicants prove that their government officially recognizes do-
mestic violence via criminal laws designed to protect victims,
and that they have sought protection through those laws.  Wor-
ryingly, applying the “social distinction” test this way would
exclude the most vulnerable victims—those whose native gov-
ernments do not make any official attempt to protect them and
those who for some reason cannot or do not seek or receive
protection from official sources.
Even aside from the BIA’s problematic suggestions regard-
ing evidence for “social distinction,” it is concerning that the
BIA’s “social distinction” definition differs little from “social vis-
ibility.”  In Matter of A-R-C-G- the BIA declared that “social dis-
tinction” exists when the society in question “perceives,
considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular charac-
teristic to be a group.”104  This definition sounds eerily similar
to the requirement that Rody Alvarado failed more than a dec-
ade ago—“a group that is recognized and understood to be a
societal faction, or is otherwise a recognized segment of the
population, within Guatemala.”105  Such similarity is unsur-
prising when old approaches are refined rather than overruled,
but it gives rise to the concern that the underlying reasoning—
now used to support the opposite finding—will crumble if
challenged.
Notably, the DHS conceded in Matter of A-R-C-G- that a
particular social group existed and that the persecution oc-
curred because the victim belonged to that group.106  This al-
lowance makes the strength of the BIA’s reasoning even more
questionable.  What happens when the DHS does not concede?
If the DHS does reject a claim and push comes to shove, the
main rationale justifying Matter of A-R-C-G-’s result—“social
distinction”—is essentially the same “social visibility” test that
similar applicants failed for years.
applicant can demonstrate “that the Guatemalan Government was unwilling or
unable to control the ‘private’ actor.” Id. at 395 (quoting Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder,
709 F.3d 728 at 732–33 (8th Cir. 2013)).
104 Id. at 393–94 (quoting Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (B.I.A.
2014)).
105 Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc), vacated, 22
I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded
and stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
106 26 I. & N. Dec. at 395.
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Another problem in Matter of A-R-C-G- is the BIA’s circular
logic when it defines a particular social group in terms of its
persecution.107  The BIA’s scant analysis does little to resolve
this issue.  Notably, the BIA has consistently resisted this type
of circularity.108  For example, in Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, the
BIA expressly held that “a social group cannot be defined exclu-
sively by the fact that its members have been subjected to
harm.”109  Nonetheless, the BIA did not acknowledge this in-
consistency in its reasoning in Matter of A-R-C-G- and it left its
analysis to rest almost exclusively on concessions made by the
DHS.110
Still, the frailties in the BIA’s logic may be irrelevant.  If
immigration judges simply copy the BIA’s holding that domes-
tic violence victims can constitute a cognizable social group,
such asylum seekers will succeed.  However, mere imitation
should not dictate possible life-or-death decisions.  Moreover,
such weak reasoning is exactly what caused the current major
problem with asylum claims—inconsistencies in adjudica-
tion.111  This issue raises a larger question: Should there be a
social distinction requirement at all?  Whether the requirement
is referred to as “social distinction” or “social visibility,” should
applicants even have to demonstrate that their society per-
ceives them as a member of a distinct social group?
4. The UNHCR Approach to Social Groups
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) has issued numerous guidelines stating that it be-
lieves that asylum seekers should not necessarily have to
demonstrate social perception of their particular social
group.112  UNHCR accepts social perception as a useful way for
107 See id. at 392–93.
108 See, e.g., Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242 (B.I.A. 2014) (“[A]
social group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been
subjected to harm.” (quoting Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74
(B.I.A. 2007))); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 218 (B.I.A. 2014) (“[A] social
group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been
subjected to harm.” (quoting Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74
(B.I.A. 2007))).
109 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007).
110 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93.
111 See supra Part I.A.
112 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection
No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status Based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender
Identity Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/12/09
(Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/509136ca9.pdf [http://perma.cc/L6PT-
7HCG]; see also Michelle Foster, The ‘Ground with the Least Clarity’: A Compara-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN404.txt unknown Seq: 21  4-MAY-16 13:24
2016] ASYLUM AT LAST? 1073
asylum seekers to define their particular social group, but it
has explicitly stated that social perception is only one of two
alternative approaches to defining a particular social group.113
It has declared that asylum seekers should be able to base
their definition of a particular social group on social perception
or on a common immutable characteristic—“both approaches
are legitimate.  The group only needs to be identifiable through
one of the approaches, not both.”114
The UNHCR thinks that because the two approaches could
lead to different results, they should serve as alternative ways
to prove that a particular social group exists.115  Requiring a
proposed group to meet both tests is overly restrictive and may
result in “protection gaps,” especially due to variations in ap-
plying each approach.116  UNHCR is concerned that such gaps
could lead decision makers to disregard groups that the 1951
Convention is designed to protect.117  For example, UNHCR
pointed out that even groups previously recognized by the BIA,
such as young women opposed to female genital mutilation
who had not been subjected to it, may not satisfy both tests
tive Study of Jurisprudential Developments Relating to ‘Membership of a Particu-
lar Social Group,’ at 14, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2012/02 (Aug. 2012) [hereinafter
Ground with the Least Clarity], http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f7d94722.html
[http://perma.cc/2RDH-L367] (discussing the UNHCR’s approach to particular
social group analysis and analyzing numerous UNHCR guidelines on that topic).
113 See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Statement on the Appli-
cation of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 Protocol to Victims of Trafficking in France, at 3 (June 12, 2012),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fd84b012.html [http://perma.cc/GZL6-7XLM]
(“UNHCR’s Social Group Guidelines acknowledge the validity of each approach
and attempt[ ] to thus accommodate both as alternative approaches in a standard
definition . . . .”).
114 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating
to Victims of Organized Gangs, ¶ 34 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/4bb21fa02.html [https://perma.cc/AC9J-TY26].
115 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
“Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of
the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
¶¶ 9-11, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter Guidelines on
International Protection], http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html [http://
perma.cc/ED6Y-JTM4].
116 See id. ¶ 10.
117 Brief of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 25, Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663
F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 08-4564) [hereinafter UNHCR Brief], http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49ef25102.html [http://perma.cc/S8P2-G2CK].
The UNHCR specifically emphasized the need to protect groups that meet the
social perception test but not the immutable and fundamental characteristic re-
quirement, such as groups based on occupation or social class. See Guidelines
on International Protection, supra note 115, ¶¶ 9-13. R
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because members of society may not be aware of those
women.118
Relying on social perception as one of two separately suffi-
cient ways to define a particular social group is appealing be-
cause it extends protection to groups that satisfy either test.
This is significant for domestic violence victims because the
BIA has not yet declared that they necessarily satisfy either
test.  Although the BIA has recognized gender as an immutable
characteristic, it has not yet accepted groups defined by gender
alone.119  The BIA stated in Matter of A-R-C-G- only that marital
status “can be an immutable characteristic where the individ-
ual is unable to leave the relationship,” not that it necessarily is
an immutable characteristic.120  Furthermore, such a declara-
tion would not protect unmarried victims.  Allowing either ap-
proach to suffice could make an important difference for
domestic violence victims in particular because their abuse is
often hidden behind closed doors, making it less likely that
society perceives group members, since it does not see them.121
Additionally, under the UNHCR approach socially per-
ceived groups of domestic violence victims comprised of both
genders could qualify as “particular social groups” even though
they are not based on the immutable characteristic of being a
woman.122
Thus, the UNHCR approach would give immigration judges
more freedom to focus on the merits, rather than the approach,
of domestic violence victims’ claims that they constitute a par-
ticular social group.  This would be better because applicants
would more likely be judged on the merits of their claim, rather
than on a technicality requiring both tests, even if one is al-
ready clearly met.
Still, the UNHCR’s approach is not perfect.  Numerous
scholars have pointed out various ambiguities and uncertain-
ties in the UNHCR’s approach.123  One concern is that it is
overinclusive, possibly to the point that it does not limit the
pool of asylum applicants at all.124  Another issue is that it is
118 See UNHCR Brief, supra note 117, at 25–26. R
119 See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392–93 (B.I.A. 2014).
120 Id. (emphasis added).
121 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. R
122 See Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 115, at ¶¶ 9-15. R
123 See, e.g., Ground with the Least Clarity, supra note 112, at 14–15 (“One R
element of the UNHCR definition [of particular social group] that might be thought
unclear is the idea that a [particular social group] is one whose members share a
common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted or who are per-
ceived as group [sic].”).
124 See id. at 15.
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not clear whether the social perception alternative is aimed at
determining if a group is objectively distinguishable, or if it is
focused on the “subjective perceptions of those in the relevant
society.”125  Nonetheless, the benefits of the UNHCR approach
may outweigh the drawbacks, particularly as compared to the
problems with the United States’ current framework.126  How-
ever, adopting the UNHCR’s approach to social perception does
not address problems that domestic violence victims may en-
counter as they attempt to meet another requirement to qualify
for asylum in the United States: nexus.
C. Nexus: The Everlasting Issue
Nexus also remains an obstacle to domestic violence-based
asylum claims.  The BIA did not interpret nexus in a new fash-
ion in Matter of A-R-C-G-.127  Rather, the BIA emphasized that
“[i]n particular, the issue of nexus will depend on the facts and
circumstances of an individual claim.”128  Accordingly, immi-
gration judges will likely apply the nexus requirement as they
did in the past—oftentimes to deny asylum claims based on
domestic violence.129  Further, the BIA’s qualification that
nexus evaluations depend on individual circumstances could
provide hesitant judges with a convenient excuse to deny
claims for failing to satisfy the nexus requirement.
The new “social distinction” concept, combined with the
BIA’s official recognition that domestic violence victims can
constitute a cognizable particular social group, could provide a
theoretical foundation for judges to more easily recognize
nexus in domestic violence claims in the future.  However, as
discussed above, “social distinction” is not a novel concept.130
Thus, although it could be applied dramatically differently than
“social visibility,” that possibility is not certain and seems
unlikely.
125 Id. at 75.
126 See infra Part III.D. for further discussion of the fear that lowering limita-
tions on asylum grants could cause an influx of asylum seekers.
127 See 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 395 (B.I.A. 2014).
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917, 920 (B.I.A. 1999) (en
banc) (denying asylum to a domestic violence victim in part because she could not
prove nexus, i.e., that she was persecuted because of her political opinion or her
membership in a particular social group), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G.
2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded and stay lifted, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
130 See supra Part II.A–B.
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D. Problems Presented by Matter of A-R-C-G-
In the end, Matter of A-R-C-G- opened a window for willing
judges to grant asylum to domestic violence victims, but it did
not provide a sound footing for such claims.  It does not set up
a framework that drives judges to accept such claims.  Once
again, it is up to immigration judges—the real arm of the law—
to enact change.  The question is, will they?
Matter of A-R-C-G- is the BIA’s clearest comment on domes-
tic violence-based asylum claims in more than a decade.  It
indicated that the BIA now favors granting asylum in at least
some domestic violence asylum cases.  However, this move may
not be enough to override immigration judges’ concerns about
a shift.  Ultimately, Matter of A-R-C-G- leaves the situation
much the same as before—“whether a woman fleeing domestic
violence will receive protection in the United States seems to
depend not on the consistent application of objective princi-
ples, but rather on the view of her individual judge . . . .”131
III
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS IN LIGHT OF MATTER OF A-R-C-G-
What changes could provide a sound footing for domestic
violence asylum claims?  Now that the BIA has recognized that
domestic violence victims can form a particular social group, is
it necessary to add gender as a sixth ground for asylum?
Should the BIA recognize a “particular social group” based
solely on gender?  Although the BIA confirmed in Matter of A-R-
C-G- that gender is considered an immutable characteristic, it
did not accept a particular social group defined by gender
alone.132  What changes should be made in light of Matter of A-
R-C-G-?
Over the years numerous scholars have recommended that
the BIA recognize a social group defined by gender.133  For
example, Jessica Marsden advocated such recognition with the
hope that it would focus analysis on a factual inquiry into an
asylum seeker’s circumstances rather than the legal adequacy
of a proposed social group.134  In Matter of A-R-C-G- the BIA
recognized that domestic violence victims can constitute a par-
131 Bookey, supra note 19, at 147–48 (discussing domestic violence asylum R
claims after Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- but before Matter of A-R-C-G-).
132 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392.
133 See, e.g., Marsden, supra note 8, at 2544–46 (proposing a regulation stat- R
ing that “a social group defined solely by the gender of its members is cognizable
as a particular social group”).
134 Id. at 2545.
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ticular social group depending on the circumstances in the
asylum seeker’s country.135  However, it did not hold that do-
mestic violence victims necessarily qualify as a particular so-
cial group.  Thus, although the BIA’s decision in Matter of A-R-
C-G- potentially shifts claim analysis toward a greater focus on
the particular asylum seeker’s circumstances and country con-
ditions,136 it has not made such a change mandatory.  Addi-
tionally, Matter of A-R-C-G- did not address the problem of
inconsistency in claim adjudication.137
Overall, although Matter of A-R-C-G- marked a step forward
for domestic violence victims seeking asylum, the holding con-
tains several significant limitations and ultimately does not
provide such asylum seekers with certainty that their claims
will succeed.  Further, the BIA is unlikely to make any more
radical changes that could provide such security.  Still, that
does not mean that progress has been halted.
A. How Immigration Judges Can Apply and Expand Matter
of A-R-C-G-‘s Approach to “Particular Social Groups”
The BIA’s holding in Matter of A-R-C-G- provides openings
that immigration judges can use to asylum seekers’ advantage,
if they so desire.  Most notably, although the BIA only recog-
nized a very narrowly defined, country-specific social group in
Matter of A-R-C-G-, “married women in Guatemala who are un-
able to leave their relationship,”138 immigration judges could
extend the holding by recognizing the same social group based
on the same types of evidence but in a different country.  Deci-
sion makers could expand the holding piecemeal by granting
asylum to similarly situated women from one other country
and then another and so forth.  Eventually the geographic limi-
tation could be dropped from the definition altogether.
Toward that end, immigration judges should follow the
framework that the BIA used to determine that the conditions
in Guatemala satisfied the social distinction requirement.  By
doing so, decision makers can grant asylum to otherwise-quali-
fied applicants from countries with conditions very similar to
Guatemala without much fear that the BIA will overturn their
decisions.
135 26 I. & N. Dec. at 394–95.
136 See id. (“[W]ithin the domestic violence context, the issue of social distinc-
tion will depend on the facts and evidence in each individual case, including
documented country conditions . . . .”).
137 See supra Part I.A.
138 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 390.
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Based on the BIA’s reasoning in Matter of A-R-C-G-, the
main evidence that the BIA relied on to analyze Guatemala’s
“documented country conditions” were: (1) laws designed to
protect domestic violence victims, (2) problematic enforcement
of those laws, (3) a culture of domestic violence, and (4) high
rates of domestic violence, including sexual offenses.139
Judges should rely on the same types of evidence to grant
asylum to applicants from countries with conditions similar to
Guatemala, normalizing such grants over time.
The BIA’s decision to open asylum to Guatemalan victims
of domestic violence paved the way for similarly situated asy-
lum seekers from other countries.  Now it is up to judges to
extend Matter of A-R-C-G- by using the same reasoning to grant
asylum to women from other countries.  Further, a piecemeal
approach could be used to expand asylum to similarly situated
victims in Guatemala and elsewhere, and to others, such as
unmarried women or men, who are excluded from the narrow
social group recognized in Matter of A-R-C-G-.  By steadily rein-
forcing and building on the BIA’s reasoning in Matter of A-R-C-
G-, it should eventually become clear that all domestic violence
victims who cannot leave their relationship should have access
to asylum, regardless of marital status, gender, or national
origin.
B. Eliminating the Nexus Requirement for Domestic
Violence-Related Asylum Cases
A more drastic but effective change would be to eliminate
the nexus requirement for domestic violence-related asylum
applicants.  Such a change would address the inconsistency
that arises when judges have to make numerous decisions dur-
ing asylum claim analysis—fewer decisions leave fewer
chances for inconsistency.140  Toward that end, Marsden has
recommended that the nexus between gender and domestic
violence should be established as a matter of law (building on
her suggestion that gender qualifies as a social group).141  That
recommendation can easily be adapted to the post–Matter of A-
R-C-G- setting: when a particular social group based on domes-
tic violence is recognized, nexus should be assumed.  This as-
sumption would lessen the obstacles facing domestic violence
victims seeking asylum and decrease the opportunities for in-
consistent adjudication.
139 Id. at 394–95.
140 See Marsden, supra note 8, at 2550–51. R
141 Id. at 2550.
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Although nexus is not generally presumed as a matter of
law, such an approach is not unprecedented.  For example,
when Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act of 1996, it amended the “refugee”
definition to specify that “a person who has been forced to abort
a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization . . . shall be
deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opin-
ion.”142  Just as Congress revised the definition of refugee in
1996 in response to “the violation of a person’s basic right to
procreate,”143 it could similarly revise immigration regulations
to address human rights violations suffered by domestic vio-
lence victims around the world.
However, one major challenge to eliminating the nexus re-
quirement for domestic violence victims is justifying why they
should benefit from such a change but other asylum applicants
should not.  Nexus should apply differently in domestic vio-
lence-related asylum cases because of the exceptional difficul-
ties of proof presented by the unique and hidden nature of
such persecution.144  Barbara Barreno has noted that domes-
tic violence victims often find it extremely difficult to convince
adjudicators that they were harmed because their abusers per-
ceived them as part of a specified particular social group.145
For example, in Matter of R-A-, although the BIA acknowl-
edged that Rody Alvarado had suffered “tragic and severe
spouse abuse,”146 it found that it was “not . . . reasonable to
believe that . . . social group membership led even in part to the
respondent’s abuse.”147  Rather, the BIA found it more plausi-
ble that a “warped perception of and reaction to [Alvarado’s]
behavior, . . . psychological disorder, pure meanness, or no
apparent reason at all” motivated Alvarado’s abuser.148  How-
ever, as the vociferous dissent pointed out: “domestic violence
exist[s] as a means by which men may systematically destroy
the power of women . . . .  The fundamental purpose of domes-
142 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104–208, div. C, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–689 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012)).
143 See Sean T. Masson, Note, Cracking Open the Golden Door: Revisiting U.S.
Asylum Law’s Response to China’s One-Child Policy, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1135,
1151 (2009).
144 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. R
145 See Barreno, supra note 16, at 258. R
146 Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 927 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc), vacated, 22
I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded
and stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
147 Id. at 925.
148 Id. at 927 (emphasis added).
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tic violence is to punish, humiliate, and exercise power over the
victim on account of her gender.”149
Significantly, domestic abuse usually occurs in the home,
away from prying eyes—and witnesses.150  Further, domestic
violence victims often hide their abuse, even from their closest
friends and family members.151  These characteristics make it
particularly difficult for victims to provide evidence demon-
strating their abuser’s motives.  The hidden nature of domestic
abuse sets it apart from other harms and human rights viola-
tions.  For example, female genital mutilation is recognized in-
ternationally as a violation of human rights.152  However,
female genital mutilation is almost universally performed in
some communities where it is considered a social norm.153
Further, traditional circumcisers or medical experts generally
execute the act and their professional role indicates their mo-
tive.154  These differences are significant because nexus turns
on the persecutor’s motivation to act, and adjudicators may
want proof that a persecutor sought to harm more than one
member of a proposed particular social group.155  Thus, do-
mestic violence-based asylum cases should be treated differ-
ently.  Still, the potential (arguably) negative consequences of
changing the nexus requirement should be assessed.
First, applying nexus differently in domestic violence-re-
lated asylum cases adds another exception to an already com-
plex system.  Second, treating domestic violence victims
differently could be seen as a step down a slippery slope to
eroding the nexus requirement entirely, one particular social
group at a time.  However, nearly twenty years have passed
since Congress exempted certain asylum applicants from the
nexus requirement—those forced to undergo abortions or in-
149 Id. at 939 (Guendelsberger, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
150 See WORLD HEALTH ORG.[WHO], WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 96
(Etienne G. Krug et al. eds., 2002), http://www.who.int/violence_injury_preven
tion/violence/world_report/en/full_en.pdf?ua=1 [http://perma.cc/ASW3-
WMB2] (“Studies have shown that around 20–70% of abused women never told
another person about the abuse until they were interviewed for the study.”).
151 See id.
152 See WHO, Female Genital Mutilation  (Feb. 2016), http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ [https://perma.cc/HGW3-Q6H9].
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 920 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc) (“If
group membership were the motivation behind [the persecutor’s] abuse, one
would expect to see some evidence of it manifested in actions toward other mem-
bers of the same group.”), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23
I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded and stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G.
2008).
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voluntary sterilization under “a coercive population control
program”—and other applicants still need to demonstrate
nexus.156  Further, perhaps a system without a nexus require-
ment would function more smoothly and effectively protect
more at risk asylum seekers.  Either way, on balance, the
nexus requirement should be eliminated in domestic violence-
related asylum cases to mitigate issues of inconsistency in ad-
judication and to effectively accommodate problems of proof
that are particular to domestic violence victims.
Such a drastic change—in effect, eliminating the nexus
requirement for domestic violence-based claims—appears un-
likely to come from the BIA, which has the power to create new
precedent but has instead focused on cautiously altering its
approach over time,157 or immigration judges, who must follow
the BIA’s precedential decisions.158  Additionally, the BIA does
not have the legal authority to make a more sweeping change
by adding gender as a sixth ground for asylum—only Congress
does.159  Realistically, any more radical developments would
need to come from outside the BIA; for example, Congress
could make amendments to the federal asylum regulations.
C. Creating Change by Revising and Enacting the Asylum
Regulation Amendments
Ideally, the proposed yet still pending regulations should
be amended to codify Matter of A-R-C-G-‘s recognition that do-
mestic violence victims can constitute a cognizable social group
for asylum purposes, as well as other beneficial changes.  The
regulations have been pending for more than a decade and do
not reflect more recent precedent, such as Matter of
A-R-C-G-.160  However, simply including the ruling made in
Matter of A-R-C-G- would not provide domestic violence victims
156 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-689 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012)).
157 See, e.g., Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392 (B.I.A. 2014) (“The
‘social distinction’ requirement renames the former concept of ‘social visibility’
and clarifies ‘the importance of “perception” or “recognition” to the concept of the
particular social group.’”  (quoting Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 216
(B.I.A. 2014))).
158 See supra notes 22 and 63 and accompanying text. R
159 Adding gender as a sixth ground would be more drastic because the INA
only recognizes five specified grounds for asylum, whereas the “particular social
group” provision is not strictly defined or limited.  Congress would need to amend
the statute. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42) (2012).
160 See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000).
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with an adequately certain avenue to asylum, for the reasons
discussed above.  Instead, the regulations should be amended
to include additional changes, such as eliminating the nexus
requirement for domestic violence victims.  Enacting regulation
amendments along the lines described below would provide a
solid footing for future asylum applicants.
1. Previously Proposed Asylum Regulation Amendments
The INS’s proposed amendments to the regulations were
intended to “aid in the assessment of claims made by appli-
cants who have suffered or fear domestic violence.”161  They
were crafted partly in response to the uproar caused by the
1999 decision in Matter of R-A-.162  The proposed amendments
would revise the definition of “persecution,” the nexus require-
ment, and the meaning of “membership in a particular social
group.”163  However, the revisions are outdated in light of deci-
sions such as Matter of A-R-C-G-.164  They should be updated to
reflect the current state of the law.  Additional changes should
be made to address the particular needs of domestic violence
victims seeking asylum in the United States and achieve the
stated goal of the amendments.
For example, under the previously proposed amendments,
in a case involving a persecutor with mixed motives, applicants
claiming membership in a particular social group would have
to show that their group membership is “central to the persecu-
tor’s motivation to act against the [victim]” to satisfy nexus.165
This would codify the standard relied on in recent cases, such
as Matter of W-G-R-.166  However, as discussed above, that
standard does not adequately aid the assessment of claims by
domestic violence victims.
161 See id.
162 See id. at 76,589 (“This proposed rule removes certain barriers that the In
re R-A- decision seems to pose to [domestic violence-based] claims . . . .”); see also
supra note 36 and accompanying text. R
163 See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,597–98 (pro-
posed Dec. 7, 2000).  Please note that the proposed amendments would also
revise several other points.
164 Further, the amendments were arguably misguided even at the time they
were enacted.  For example, see Anita Sinha, Note, Domestic Violence and U.S.
Asylum Law: Eliminating the “Cultural Hook” for Claims Involving Gender-Related
Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562, 1592 (2001), for a critique contemporaneous
with the proposed regulations.
165 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,598.
166 See 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 224 (B.I.A. 2014) (“The respondent bears the
burden of showing that his membership in a particular social group was or will be
a central reason for his persecution.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN404.txt unknown Seq: 31  4-MAY-16 13:24
2016] ASYLUM AT LAST? 1083
Similarly, although the preamble to the amendments
evokes the holding in Matter of A-R-C-G- when it notes that
“[g]ender is clearly such an immutable trait . . . [and that] there
may be circumstances in which an applicant’s marital status
could be considered immutable,”167 the proposed definition of
“membership in a particular social group” does not unequivo-
cally state that either characteristic is in itself enough to define
a particular social group.168
To provide solid footing for asylum claims based on domes-
tic violence, the proposed regulation amendments need to be
revised.
2. Revising the Regulations in Light of Matter
of A-R-C-G-
The regulation amendments should be changed in two key
ways to solve the myriad issues that remain even after Matter of
A-R-C-G-.  First, the UNHCR’s approach to assessing proposed
particular social groups should be adopted.  Additionally, gen-
der should be explicitly recognized as a particular social group.
Second, applicants in domestic violence-based asylum cases
should be exempt from the nexus requirement, for the reasons
discussed above.169
If the asylum regulations are revised in these ways, adjudi-
cators can avoid the various problems with the current system
that are discussed at length in Parts II.B.3–III.B, such as in-
consistency in adjudication and problems of proof particular to
domestic violence victims.  Additionally, these changes will ob-
viate the need to pursue other, less effective remedies to resolve
the issues with the current system.  For example, if the regula-
tions expressly state that a particular social group can be de-
fined by gender, adjudicators will not need to slowly expand
Matter of A-R-C-G-‘s holding to encompass groups of female
domestic violence victims from countries other than Guate-
mala.  Asylum applicants can instead base their claims on their
membership in the particular social group of “women.”
167 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg.  at 76,593 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000).
168 See id. at 76,598.
169 See supra Part III.B.  Alternatively, the government could adopt UNHCR’s
bifurcated approach to nexus, which was designed to work in conjunction with
the UNHCR approach to assessing proposed particular social groups. See Guide-
lines on International Protection, supra note 115, ¶¶ 22-23.  This bifurcated ap- R
proach allows applicants to demonstrate nexus by establishing that their
persecutor harmed them because of their membership in a particular social group
or that their State was unwilling or unable to protect them because of their
membership in a particular social group. See id.
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D. No Need to Fear a Flood of Asylum Seekers
When pushing for progress, it is important to keep oppo-
nents’ concerns in mind to avoid inciting needless backlash
that could delay future progress or even set it back.  In the
domestic violence-based asylum context, those who resist re-
form frequently raise the “fear of ‘opening the floodgates.’”170
Immigration opponents fear that if the United States expands
its asylum protections, asylum seekers will flood into the
United States, overwhelming the immigration system.171  At
first glance, this concern seems rational, given that domestic
violence is a global issue affecting countless people, particu-
larly women.172  Nonetheless, this fear likely does not warrant
restricting asylum for numerous reasons.
First, domestic violence causes psychological effects that
make victims unlikely to flee abuse.173  Second, domestic vio-
lence victims may very well wish to leave their abusers but not
their country and other family members, particularly their chil-
dren.174  Third, the BIA’s comparable recognition in Matter of
Kasinga that female genital mutilation victims can constitute a
particular social group did not lead to an influx of asylum
seekers.175  Further, asylum applicants have not flooded Ca-
nada, even though it has accepted asylum applications based
on domestic violence since 1993.176  In fact, between 1995 and
1999 Canada received ever-fewer gender-related asylum
claims.177  Additionally, as the DHS has pointed out, the
United States did not experience a rise in domestic violence-
based asylum claims after Alvarado was granted asylum in
170 See Cianciarulo & David, supra note 9, at 380; Marsden, supra note 8, at R
2553; Reimann, supra note 31, at 1258. R
171 See supra note 170. R
172 See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. R
173 See Cianciarulo & David, supra note 9, at 381. R
174 See id.; see also Reimann, supra note 31, at 1260 (“[W]omen are often the R
primary or only caretakers of children and may not wish to leave their families
behind or endanger them by taking them along . . . .”).
175 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (B.I.A. 1996); see also Karen Musalo, Protecting
Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?,
14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 132–33 (2007) (noting that an INS publication
admitted that “INS has not seen an appreciable increase in the number of claims
based on FGM” since the Kasinga decision (quoting IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Questions and Answers: The R-A- Rule (Dec. 7,
2000), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/RA_Rule_USCIS_12
_07_2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/T342-JCJ5])).
176 See DHS Brief, supra note 53, at 13 n.10. R
177 See id.
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Matter of R-A-.178  These facts suggest that the fear of the flood-
gates is unwarranted with regard to domestic violence victims.
Finally, the asylum adjudication system is focused on fact-
based inquiry into each applicant’s circumstances.179  Only in-
dividual asylum seekers who can prove that they meet the
INA’s requirements are eligible for asylum.  On principle, quali-
fying applicants should not be rejected simply because changes
to the system might increase the applicant pool.180  Prema-
turely rejecting applicants who could qualify for asylum simply
because they are domestic violence victims would make the
asylum claim process pointless.  Additionally, even if an appli-
cant meets all the legal requirements for asylum, an immigra-
tion judge still has discretion to deny the application.181
Therefore, the BIA and immigration judges should not let the
fear of opening the floodgates dictate their approach to asylum
adjudication.
CONCLUSION
In Matter of A-R-C-G- the BIA officially recognized that
under certain circumstances, domestic violence victims consti-
tute a cognizable particular social group.  This holding marked
a significant step forward for domestic violence victims seeking
asylum in the United States.  However, it still does not provide
such applicants with any certainty that their claims will suc-
ceed.  If such security is the goal, further changes must be
made.  At the least, immigration judges should expand the
holding to apply to asylum seekers from countries other than
Guatemala.  Eventually, decision makers will also need to dras-
tically reinterpret aspects of asylum analysis and perhaps even
eliminate requirements such as nexus, because the current
system does not fully accommodate domestic violence’s com-
plexities.  This can be achieved by amending the federal asylum
regulations.  Ultimately, although Matter of A-R-C-G- is an im-
portant step toward providing asylum for domestic violence
victims, it does not go far enough.
178 Id.
179 See, e.g., Gregory S. Porter, Persecution Based on Political Opinion: Interpre-
tation of the Refugee Act of 1980, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 231, 263 (1992) (“Adjudica-
tions of asylum applications are very much fact-based and decisions often come
down to issues of credibility.”).
180 See Marsden, supra note 8, at 2553. R
181 See generally Kate Aschenbrenner, Discretionary (In)Justice: The Exercise
of Discretion in Claims for Asylum, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 595, 604–11 (2012)
(discussing the development of discretion as an element in asylum eligibility).
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